The Stakes in Syria

Impressive, not decisive…

Friday’s missile attack on Syria by the US, Britain, and France was a tactical solution to a tactical problem. The Assad regime used banned chemical weapons to attack civilians, and the US and its allies responded with a highly focused and limited assault as symbolic punishment for such use. In the world of geo-politics, it was the equivalent of the half time show at the Super Bowl; lots of anticipation and then action, but over quickly with no impact on the game.

The larger, systemic Syrian issues remain, unresolved.

Syria is important because key US foreign policy priorities converge on it.

Alarmed about Iranian expansionism in the Middle East? Fearful that hard-won gains will be lost in Iraq? Distressed about the future of the Kurds? Disquieted by Turkey’s military moves outside NATO?? Apprehensive about catalyzing new terrorist groups, post-ISIS? Worried about Israel’s strategic security? Nervous about Russian adventurism beyond its borders? Appalled at the use of chemical weapons?

These elements are all at play in Syria today, principally due to the Obama administration’s subordination of US interests in the region to those of Iran, all in a debatable effort to get a nuclear agreement. While targeted, limited, US assistance to the anti-Assad resistance would have made a tangible difference in Syria at the beginning of the civil war, the Obama administration simply threw that opportunity away. The result? 500,000 dead, millions displaced, a refugee crisis and a failed state that has become home to radical terrorist groups, destabilizing the region through foreign adventurism, and Assad still in power.

Simply stated, the chemical weapons attack on civilians by Assad is but a symptom of the problem in Syria, not the cause. A comprehensive US strategy in the Middle East needs to recognize this reality, no matter how distasteful it may be to a nation exhausted by nearly 18 years of war in the region.

This will come as particularly unwelcome news for President Trump, who only days before the latest Assad chemical weapons attack had been arguing publicly for a full withdrawal of American military personnel from Syria. US troops have been quietly operating in Syria as part of a US-led coalition that has virtually obliterated ISIS, but has scrupulously avoided getting involved in the larger issues of the Syrian civil war. With that mission done, Trump wants out, quickly, but such action would necessarily entail leaving behind a power vacuum that would ill-serve longer-term US interests; not unlike President Obama’s irresponsible 2011 withdrawal from Iraq.

The beginning of a comprehensive Syria policy begin with two pillars – the existing US forces on the ground, and the continued, credible threat of US retaliation against Assad for chemical weapons use. The troops provide the US with high performance teams that can influence events on the ground, and keep pressure on Assad. The threat of retaliation raises the stakes for Assad regarding his preferred method of dealing with forces arrayed against his regime.

A third pillar would be a robust financing of arms and logistical support  of the anti-Assad rebels, and comprehensive efforts to keep the Kurds as a viable fighting force, guaranteeing Kurdish territory in northeast Syria, while at the same time, toning down Kurdish impulses to create their own state.

The presence of US ground forces in Syria, and the threat of US/allied retaliation for chemical weapons use, combined with large contingents of well armed military groups opposed to Assad’s rule, represent leverage toward a settlement in Syria. And settlement is the only real option.

There was a time, many years ago, when Assad’s ouster was the first requirement of any deal on Syria, but that moment passed with the Obama administration. At this point, having intervened so extensively, the Russians will never willingly see Assad go. Using US military power to force the issue engenders disproportionate risk, with little return.

The terms of the settlement are straight forward, if distasteful.

  1. A cease-fire between pro-Assad forces and the opposition.
  2. Creation of a government of national reconciliation under Assad, which would include meaningful roles for Sunni Syrians, Kurds and other minority groups, with variations of autonomy granted for local areas.
  3. A real inspection regime to assure that stocks of chemical weapons and the machinery to manufacture them has been destroyed.
  4. A policy from the new Syrian government to ban the operation of terrorist groups within the country, guaranteed with military forces outside the country.
  5. The removal of foreign military forces from Syria, this would include the US and Iran, with a Russian reduction to pre-civil war levels.
  6. A Russian commitment not to replace and expand Assad’s military with modern weapons.
  7. The creation of “Rebuild Syria” which would channel aid, placing priority on humanitarian assistance.

These steps, in combination, provide a path toward self-determination for the Sunni majority and protection for other minorities. Shuts down the ability of ISIS or similar groups to catalyze on Syrian territory. Stymies Iran’s pre-occupation with creating a Shia crescent from Tehran to Beirut, while improving Israel’s strategic defense with a manageable and stable northern border. The Kurds are guaranteed, and the Turks pull back. Best for President Trump, he gets to take the US forces out of Syria and claim a victory.

The optics of such an agreement would require that this be an Arab only solution. There is too much US and Russian prestige on the line in Syria to make any pull back, but if the Arab League, in conjunction with the UN were to broker such a deal – with the US and Russians pulling the strings behind the scenes, everyone gets a settlement without losing face.

No one should be under any illusions that this is anything more than a constructive truce.  Assad will not go on forever. Upon his death, there will be a power struggle. However, if these hypothetical steps were taken, there is a greater likelihood that resolution would not require a full-fledged civil war and a repeat of the last 8 years of violence.

It’s up to the US and it’s allies to see if this formula can work.